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Abstract
This article examines the three-, five- and ten-year long-run performance of initial public 
offerings (IPOs) on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). The Buy and Hold 
Abnormal Return (BHAR) and the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) methods were 
used to calculate the IPO long-run performance. Using a sample of 313 companies listed 
for the period 1996– 2007, this study established that IPOs on the (JSE) underperformed 
the market over three years (by 65.59% and 59.77% for BHAR and CAR respectively) and 
five years (by 64.37% and 7.77% for BHAR and CAR respectively). Also observed was 
that IPOs on the JSE outperform the market over a ten-year period when using the CAR 
(116.23%). Furthermore, the three-, five- and ten-year BHAR in the JSE were affected by the 
market period, which had no significant impact on the CAR. These findings basically stress 
the effect the different benchmarks and methodologies have when calculating the long-run 
performance of IPOs. Although IPOs underperform the market over a five-year period from 
the first trading day, the yearly performance of most of these companies from their fourth 
trading year is positive. As such, investors are advised to stay out of the stock market within 
the first three years, but in the fourth year they are encouraged to invest and buy mainly 
portfolios comprising companies that have been trading for at least four years.
Keywords: IPO, long-run performance, JSE
1 Introduction
Existing research (Loughran & Ritter, 1995; Ritter & Welch, 2002; Álvarez & 
González, 2005; Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist, 2010) suggests that investing in 
initial public offerings (IPOs) is a poor strategy, since IPOs mostly underperform a 
market index. This is because the long-run underperformance of IPO shares tends 
to hurt investors, given that they do not get an opportunity to earn superior long-run 
returns from their investments. Liu (2009) defines the long run underperformance of 
IPOs as the negative average return over a long period after the issue. Yuhong (2010) 
asserts that long-run underperformance means that ‘relative to other companies, 
investors appear to lose out by continuing to hold the shares of a company that 
have recently gone public’. Various studies (Drobetz, Kammerman & Wälchli, 2005; 
Gounopoulos, Nounis & Stylianides, 2008; Govindaamy, 2010; Santos, 2011) have 
provided evidence that IPO companies tend to underperform in a three- to five-year 
period, subsequent to an IPO. 
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49There has been extensive evidence of long-run underperformance in IPO markets 
worldwide, ranging in magnitude across different markets (Karlsson & Sköld, 2006; 
Govindasamy, 2010). For example, Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi (2007), who 
studied the performance of 252 IPOs listed on the London Stock Exchange from 
1991–1995, observed that over the first 36 months, the average returns were -21.3 
per cent. In studying the Taiwan stock market, Wen and Cao (2013) ascertained that 
when using the BHAR, IPOs underperform the market over a one-, three- and five-
year period by -6.2, -34 and (a severe) 55 per cent, respectively. Jaskiewicz, González, 
Menéndez and Schiereck (2005), using a sample of 153 companies over the period 
1990–2001, showed a BHAR of -32.8 per cent over three years. Cai, Liu and Mase 
(2008), using a sample of 335 companies, found a BHAR of -29.6 per cent over a 
three-year period. Assessing the five-year performance of listed IPOs in the United 
States (US), Gomper and Lerner (2003) established that when using the CAPM and 
Fama and French three factor model, both showed results which were insignificantly 
different from zero, or were even significantly positive in the long run. Drobetz, 
Kammerman and Wälchli (2005) examined the long-run performance of 109 Swiss 
IPOs from 1983 to 2000 and found that after three years, the underperformance was 
only about 7.5 per cent, using a broad market index as the benchmark – this increased 
to 21 per cent after four years and to 101 per cent after ten. Conversely, a study of 
Malaysian IPOs revealed that they outperformed the market during the period 1992–
1996, with a substantial positive CAR of 41.7 per cent over three years (Corhay, Teo 
& Rad, 2002). Nevertheless, prior studies by Fama (1998), Saleh and Mashal (2008) 
and Espenlaub et al. (2000) contend that the underperformance of IPOs is sensitive 
to the methodology used to estimate abnormal performance. Likewise, studies by 
Ritter (1991) and Thomadakis, Nounis and Gounopoulos (2012) have shown that the 
market period in which the IPO is issued has a significant influence on its long-run 
performance.
50In South Africa, several studies have been conducted on the JSE in order to 
document what happens with IPOs in the short and long run. For example, 
Govindasamy (2010) looked at the long-run performance of IPOs between 1995 and 
2006, over a three year period. Using the BHAR and CAR methods, he showed 
that the IPOs underperformed the market by 50 per cent and 47 per cent for BHAR 
and CAR respectively, and that there were significant differences across sectors. 
Mangozhe (2010), who examined the long run investment performance of IPOs 
during from 1992 to 2007, found no evidence of abnormal performance. However, 
he noted that IPO performance depended on market conditions, since IPOs 
performed well in periods of market buoyancy (bull market) and suffered in periods 
of market distress (bear market). Also,  a study by M’kombe and Ward (2002) on the 
aftermarket price performance of IPOs on the JSE during the period 1980 to 1998, 
established that IPOs on the JSE underperformed the market by 21.47, 35.67 and 
87.84 per cent, over a  three-, five and ten-year period respectively, when using the 
CAPM model. While these studies provide significant information on the long-run 
performance of IPOs on the JSE over various periods, it is important to note that 
further studies documenting this market trend still need to be completed. Given that 
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no recently published study on the JSE examined the long-run performance of IPOs 
over a three-, five- and ten-year period, using the sample frame of 1996 to 2007 and 
BHAR and CAR as benchmarks, this is exactly what the present study, on which 
this article is based, set out to achieve. The deliberate choice of a 1996 start date is 
significant – this is the year when the JSE All Share Index (ALSI) was introduced. 
The study uses the ALSI as a broad benchmark to assess the abnormal returns from 
these listings, to justify the study.
51It is against this backdrop that the article aims to examine the aftermarket 
performance of IPOs listed on the JSE during 1996 to 2007, extending to the three, 
five and ten years following the IPO date. The authors aim to determine whether 
IPOs on the JSE outperformed or underperformed when using the BHAR and 
CAR methods. In particular, the article aims to provide a deeper understanding of 
newly issuing companies, as regards IPOs. Similarly, it will help listed companies 
understand their performances after the IPO, and guide them in making informed 
decisions when planning for seasoned equity offerings. The hope is that this study 
will help investors become more analytical and cautious in placing their investments. 
2 Literature review
2.1 Theoretical explanation and prior evidence on long-run  
performance
Many theories have been advanced in an attempt to explain the issue of long-run 
underperformance. For example, a study by Karlsson and Sköld (2006) found that 
theories or hypotheses such as the impresario/fads, the window of opportunity, the 
earnings management, the overestimate and the signalling hypothesis can be used to 
explain long-run underperformance.
52According to Ritter (1991) there are periods in which investors tend to be 
overoptimistic about the earnings potential of companies – periods he terms ‘fads’. 
Rhee (2002) defines a fad as a temporary overvaluation caused by over-optimism 
on the part of investors. Since investors tend to be irrationally over-optimistic when 
trading starts, companies are usually able to distinguish periods when investors are 
optimistic and chose to go public when the market gives them a more favourable 
valuation, i.e., they capture a window of opportunity. According to Lijun (2006), 
the behavioural finance explanation suggests that share prices are subject to fads, 
and that managers and investment banks time the market in order to issue shares 
when it is overpriced and when investors are unable to discern that they are being 
taken advantage of by managers. Further evidence is provided by Rajan and 
Servaes (1994), who studied the market conditions on IPOs and indicated that more 
companies go public when other companies in the same industry are trading at high 
multiples (price-earnings or market-to-book reflecting optimistic assessments of 
the net present value of growth opportunities) with the intention of receiving high 
compensation.
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53Lijun (2006) stresses that the overestimate hypothesis sees companies predicting 
their future earning based on information available in the prospectus. Because share 
price predictions are based on the company’s anticipated future activities, analysts’ 
predictions are invaluable for investors. Predicting information included in the 
prospectus also helps to reduce information asymmetry in the IPO market. Lijun 
also suggests that since profits are projected, analysts’ predictions are sometimes 
optimistic, while company managers are either too confident in their own companies 
or are happy to accept optimistic predictions in order to attract more investors. Rajan 
and Servaes (1997) concur, providing empirical evidence that new shares with high 
initial returns usually gain more attention from market analysts. Consequently, 
analysts more often than not tend to overestimate companies’ prospects and 
profitability. Besides, when these optimisms spread across the whole security 
market, the listing of new equities is likely to increase. 
54With regard to the earning management hypothesis, Lijun (2006) maintains that 
investors usually build their expectations of future earnings levels and risks on the 
company’s past performance. Due to limited information about the issuing company 
prior to it going public, investors often judge the company’s real value based on 
information contained in the prospectus or roadshows, where verbal earnings 
projections are made. Cormier and Martinez (2005) state that in order to reduce 
the problem of information asymmetry, managers usually send credible signals 
about the earning prospects of their companies to the public. The main source of 
information comes from the financial statements presented in the prospectus. Jog 
and McConoomy (2003) examined the role played by the voluntary inclusion of 
earning forecasts in the valuation of IPOs, and established that such disclosures are 
not only relevant, they also have a noticeable impact on the degree of information 
asymmetry. However, as information is gradually revealed by the media and 
subsequent financial reports, investors notice that the earnings are not maintaining 
momentum and thus lose their optimism. Chaney and Lewis (1998) demonstrate that 
most companies managing earnings at the time of offering are more concerned about 
the short-run benefits, and thus they perform worse after the IPO. Alternatively, 
findings by Kamel (2012) show that pre-offering accruals do not explain the post-
offering underperformance in earnings, but predict a portion of the subsequent poor 
performance of the shares.
55Furthermore, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) propose a theoretical model to explain the 
IPO anomalies markets conditions and long-run underperformance. Yung, Colak 
and Wang (2006) observe that the distributions of IPO returns in hot and cold periods 
are substantially different: long-run abnormal returns increase substantially during 
hot IPO markets, with most hot IPOs tending to delist within the first few years 
after listing. Cook et al. (2003) established that the performance of IPOs during hot 
markets was worse than during cold markets. Shikha and Balwinder (2008), in their 
study on the Indian stock market, found that market conditions had a significant and 
positive relationship with the returns for the first three years, two years and one year. 
Also, Thomadakis et al. (2012), on the Athens stock market, showed that IPO long-
run performance over three years was significantly affected by the market period. 
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3 Methodology
3.1 Sample and data collection methods
The population of the study comprised a sample of 313 IPOs listed on the JSE during 
1996–2007. The information was sourced from the McGregor-BFA database, where 
data regarding the offering price, closing day prices, monthly data and number of 
shares, along with a prospectus of IPO companies, were hosted. The JSE ALSI was 
used as the broad benchmark to assess the abnormal returns from these listings. 
In calculating the long-run performance in this study where companies were de-
listed within their first three, five and ten years, the listings were not included in the 
sample. This reduced the initial sample size from 313 to 269 for three years after 
market performance, and 220 for the five years after market performance for 1996–
2007. For the ten years’ sample, the period 1996–2002 was chosen to ensure that 
data for their ten years after market performance were available, as opposed to the 
three years and five years samples. This resulted in the initial sample size reducing 
from 313 to 81 for the ten years after market performance.
3.1.2  Measurement techniques: Long-run performance
We calculated IPO long-run performance using the CAR and BHAR over 120 
months after the IPO. Firms delisted within the 36-month, 60-month and 120-month 
test period were not included in the sample. For the cumulative abnormal returns, the 
return on a security or index is defined as:
                                                                                    
Where is the return for firm i in period t; Pi,t is the price of the security at the end 
of the current period and Pi,t-1 is the price of the security at the end of the previous 
period (Suherman & Buchdadi, 2010).
56The benchmark-adjusted return for stock i in event month t is defined as:
                                                                  
Where Ri,t is the return for firm i in period t and Rm,t is the return on a benchmark 
(JSE ALSI) for the same period. 
57The average adjusted return for a portfolio of n stocks in period t is the mean of 
the benchmark-adjusted returns, which is given as:
58
                                                                                 
The cumulative adjusted return during the 36-month after market period is therefore 
the sum of the average adjusted returns for each period
                                                                                
to assess the abnormal returns from these listings. In calculating the long-run performance in 
this study where companies were de-listed within their first three, five and ten years, the 
listings were not included in the sample. This reduced the initial sample size from 313 to 269 
for three years after market performance, and 220 for the five years af e market performance 
for 1996–2007. For the ten years’ sample, the period 1996–2002 was chosen to ensure that 
data for their ten years after market performance were available, as opposed to the three years 
and five years samples. This resulted in the initial sample size reducing from 313 to 81 for the 
ten years after market performance.
3.1.2 Measurement techniques: Long-run performance
We calculated IPO long-run performance using the CAR and BHAR over 120 months after 
the IPO. Firms delisted within the 36-month, 60-month and 120-month test period were not 





� − 1                                                                                    (1)
Where Ri,t is the return for firm i in period t; Pi,t is the price of the security at the end of the 
current period and Pi,t-1 is the price of the security at the end of the previous period (Suherman 
& Buchdadi, 2010).
The benchmark-adjusted return for stock i in event month t is defined as:
ARi,t = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡                                                                    (2)
Where Ri,t is the return for firm i in period t and Rm,t is the return on a benchmark (JSE ALSI) 
for the same period. 
The average adjusted return for a portfolio of n stocks i  period t is the mean of the 




∑ ARi,tni=1                                                                                  (3)
The cumulative adjusted return during the 36-month after market period is therefore the sum 
of the average adjusted returns for each period
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅t = ∑ ARsts=1                                                                                 (4)
to assess the abnormal returns from these listings. In calculating the long-run performance in 
this study where companies were de-listed within their first three, five and ten years, the 
listings were n t included in the sample. This reduced th  initial sample ize from 313 to 269 
for three years after market performance, and 220 for the five years after market performance 
for 1996–2007. For the ten years’ sample, the period 1996–2002 was chosen to ensure that 
data for their ten years after market performance were available, as opposed to the three years 
and five years samples. This resulted in the initial sample size reducing from 313 to 81 for the 
ten years after market performance.
3.1.2 Measurement techniques: Long-run performance
We calculat d IPO long-run perform nce u ing the CAR and BHAR over 120 months after 
the IPO. Firms delisted within the 36-month, 60-month and 120-month test period were not 





� − 1                                                                                    (1)
Where Ri,t is the return for firm i in period t; Pi,t is the price of the security at the end of the 
current period and Pi,t-1 is the price of the security at the end of the previous period (Suherman 
& Buchdadi, 2010).
The benchmark-adjusted return for stock i in event month t is defined as:
ARi,t = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡                                                                    (2)
Where Ri,t is the return for firm i in period t and Rm,t is the return on a benchmark (JSE ALSI) 
for the same period. 
The average adjusted return for a portfolio of n stocks in period t is the mean of the 




∑ ARi,tni=1                                                                                 (3)
The cumulative adjusted return during the 36-month after market period is therefore the sum 
of the average adjusted returns for each period
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅t = ∑ ARts=1                                                                                 (4)
to assess the abnormal returns from these listings. In calculating the long-run performance in 
this study where companies were de-listed within their first three, five and ten years, the 
listings were not included in the sample. This reduced the initial sample size from 313 to 269 
for three years after market performance, and 220 for the five years after market performance 
for 1996–2007. For the ten years’ sample, the period 1996–2002 was chosen to ensure that 
data for their ten years aft r market performance w re available, as opposed to the hree years 
and five years samples. This resulted in the initial sample size reducing from 313 to 81 for the 
ten years after market performance.
3.1.2 Measurement tec niques: Long-run performance
We calculated IPO long-run performance using the CAR and BHAR over 120 months after 
the IPO. Firms delisted within the 36- onth, 60-month and 120-month test p riod were no  





� − 1                                                                                    (1)
Where Ri,t is the return for firm i in period t; Pi,t is the price of the security at the end of the 
current period a d Pi,t-1 is the price of the security at the end of the previous period (Suherman 
& Buchdadi, 2010).
The benchmark-adjusted return for stock i in event month t is defined as:
ARi,t = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡                                                                   (2)
Where Ri,t is the return for firm i in period t and Rm,t is the return on a benchmark (JSE ALSI) 
for the same period. 
The average adjusted return for a portfolio of n stocks in period t is the mean of the 




∑ ARi,tni=1                                                                                  (3)
cumulative adj sted return during the 36-mont  after market p iod t erefore the sum
of the average adjusted returns for each p riod
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅t = ∑ ARsts=1                                                                                 (4)
to assess the abnormal returns from these listings. In calculating the long-run performance in 
this study where companies were de-listed within their first three, five and ten years, the 
listings were not included in the sample. This reduced the initial sample size from 313 to 269 
for three years after market performance, and 220 for the five years after market performance 
for 1996–2007. For the ten years’ sample, the period 1996–2002 was chosen to ensure that 
data for their ten years after market perfor ance were available, as opposed to the th ee years 
and five years samples. This result d in the initial sampl  size reducing from 313 to 81 for the 
ten years after market performance.
3.1.2 Measurement techniques: Long-run performance
We calculated IPO long-run performance using the CAR and BHAR over 120 months after 
the IPO. Firms delisted within the 36-month, 60-month and 120- onth test period were not 





� − 1                                                                                    (1)
Where Ri,t is the return for firm i in period t; Pi,t is the price of the security at the end of the 
current period and Pi,t-1 is the price of the security at the end of the previous peri d (Suherman 
& Buchdadi, 2010).
The benchmark-adjusted return for stock i in event month t is defined as:
ARi,t = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡                                                                 (2)
Where Ri,t is th  return for firm i in period t and Rm,t is th  retur  on a benchmark (JSE ALSI) 
for the same period. 
The average adjusted return for a portfolio of n stocks in period t is the mean of the 




∑ ARi,tni=1                                                                                  (3)
The cumulative adjusted return during the 36-month after market period is therefore the sum 
of the average adjusted returns for each period





Do IPOs underperform in the long run? Evidence from the JSE
As an alternative to using CAR, we used buy-and-hold (BHAR) to compute three-
year holding period returns. BHAR is the return on a buy-and-hold investment in 
the sample firm, less the return on a buy-and-hold investment in the market index 
(JSE ALSI). For each firm i stock, the long-term returns in the after market are 
calculated from the first trading month to the month where the stock celebrates its 
third anniversary.
59The holding period return (BHR) for a firm i stock is calculated for the period 
T as
                                                         
This formula can be rewritten as:
                                                                                               
Where Ri,t is the raw return of firm i stock at time t and T is the time period for which 
the BHR is calculated.
60This is given by the following expression:
Where               is the buy-and-hold return of firm i in event month t. While Ri,t is the 
return for firm i in period t and Rm,t is the return on a benchmark (JSE ALSI) for the 
same period.
4 Results and discussion
The results on the three-, five- and ten-year performance are presented below.













One year  -5.41% -30.19% -0.76227 -8.77% -29.93% -1.4492
Two years -33.20% -79.45% -3.34163*** -45.29% -70.92% -6.08384***
Three  
years
-65.59% -94.59% -8.11958*** -59.77% -98.82% -7.27264***
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%
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Where BHAR𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the buy-and-hold return of firm i in event month t. While Ri,t is the return 
for firm i in period t and Rm,t is the return on a benchmark (JSE ALSI) for the same period.
4 Results and discussion
The re ults on the three-, five- and ten-year performance are presented below.















-5.41% -30.19% -0.76227 -8.77% -29.93% -1.4492
Two 
years
-33.20% -79.45% -3.34163*** -45.29% -70.92% -6.08384***
Three  
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JSE underperformed the market over a three-year period (by -65.59% and -59.77% 
for BHAR and CAR respectively). These findings are consistent with studies on the 
JSE and other stock markets across the world. Govindasamy (2010) established that 
IPOs on the JSE underperformed the market by 50 and 47 per cent for BHAR and 
CAR respectively, over a three-year period. Also, studies by M’kombe and Ward 
(2002) found that IPOs on the JSE underperformed the market by 21.47 per cent 
over a three-year period, when using the CAPM model as benchmark. Furthermore, 
Wen and Cao (2013), in their study on the Taiwan stock market, observed that IPOs 
underperformed the market over three years by 34 per cent, when using the BHAR. 
The negative returns starting from year one show that the effects of the huge initial 
underpricing have diminished and all indications are that the market overacted to 
the market price. This result suggests that investors who did not get the chance to 
buy their shares at the offer price (mostly individual investors) do not benefit from 
the abnormal returns, and thus incur substantial losses starting from the first year 
(using BHAR and CAR).
Table 2: IPO long-run performance for a period of five years (sample of 220) 


















year -3.77% -3.77% -23.02% -0.53207 -4.59% -4.59% -22.72% -0.77337
Two 
years -32.19% -32.03% -66.94% -3.66024*** -35.65% -31.06% -58.38% -4.8015***
Three 
years -56.33% -16.34% -84.42% -6.22473*** -46.75% -11.11% -85.60% -5.51643***
Four 
years -64.02% 2.90% -103.98% -5.43032*** -28.80% 17.96% -100.51% -1.55923
Five 
years -64.37% 5.71% -120.09% -4.02447*** -7.77% 21.02% -111.05% -0.38115
NB: The returns are based on what happens from the first trading day to the end of each year. To further understand 
the performance of the IPOs over the years, their annual performance was also recorded. Within year four and five, 
the IPO performance tends to become positive (2.90% and 5.71% for the BHAR and 17.96% and 21.02% for the 
CAR).
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%
The results in Table 2 indicate that IPOs on the JSE underperformed the market 
in a five-year period by 64.37 and 7.77 per cent, when using the BHAR and CAR 
respectively. When using the CAR, there was a drastic increase in the level of 
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underperformance in years two and three. However, the level of underperformance 
in years four and five drastically reduced to 17.96 and 21.02 per cent respectively. 
The positive returns for CAR identified in years four and five provide an incentive 
for investors to come in during the fourth year and possibly sell by the end of the 
fifth. These results are not statistically significant in years four and five, and as such, 
the trends should be interpreted with great caution. When using the BHAR, the 
level of underperformance drastically increases from years two and three (-32.19% 
and -56.33% respectively), but remains relatively stable in years four and year five 
(-64.02% and -64.37% respectively). The stability in IPO performance for years four 
and five can be explained by the positive trends established in those years. The 
BHAR however yielded only slightly positive returns within years four and five, 
giving investors little incentive to come in at the beginning of the fourth year and 
leave by the end of the fifth year. 
61The long-run underperformance of IPOs on the JSE in a five-year period is 
consistent with studies by M’kombe and Ward (2002), who observed that IPOs on the 
JSE underperformed the market in a five-year period by 35.67 per cent, when using 
the CAPM model as benchmark. However, the differences in the five-year results 
can be explained by the differences in the benchmarks used. Also, a study by Kooli 
and Suret (2004) established that IPOs in Canada underperformed the market by 
20.65 per cent in a five-year period, when using CAR. Similarly, when the calendar-
time analysis was used, the results showed that IPOs significantly underperformed 
the market. But when the event-time BHAR analysis was used, the result was no 
longer statistically significant. Gomper and Lerner (2003), who examined the five-
year performance of listed IPOs in the US, showed that IPOs underperformed the 
market when using the BHAR by 33.4 and 31.7 per cent (for equal weighted and 
value weighted respectively) when using Size and Book-to-Market as benchmarks. 
Furthermore, Wen and Cao (2013) observed that when using the BHAR, IPOs 
underperformed the Taiwan stock market over a five-year period by 55 per cent. 
62Moreover, the results further indicate that the level of underperformance over a 
five-year period was worse when using the BHAR than when using the CAR, possibly 
due to the effect of monthly compounding. BHAR includes the compounding effect, 
while CARs ignores it (Barber & Lyon, 1997). The findings, however, contradict 
Barber and Lyon (1997), who established a significant positive five-year BHAR 
and a 60-month CAR when using the equally weighted market index. However, the 
researchers noted that the positive five-year BHAR resulted from the effect of new 
listing bias which dominated the rebalancing bias. As such, it can be assumed for 
the results in Table 2 that the rebalancing bias more than offset the new listing bias, 
thereby leading to a mean negative BHAR (see Barber & Lyon, 1997). Although both 
the BHAR and the CAR in this study were negative for the five-year period, only 
the five-year BHAR was significantly different from zero. As such, it is advisable 
for investors on the JSE to consider the BHAR when calculating their long-run 
performance, as CARs are biased predictors of BHARs (Barber & Lyon, 1997).
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Table 3: IPO long-run performance for a period of ten years on a sample of 81 










One year -5.33% -5.33% -0.34005 -7.63% -7.63% -0.71529
Two years -31.43% -28.68% -1.71418* -34.25% -26.62% -2.63324**
Three 
years
-50.66% -16.44% -2.43638** -49.36% -15.11% -1.95701*
Four 
years
-44.02% 18.08% -1.50714 -35.20% 14.16% -0.92596
Five 
years
-26.41% 27.53% -0.64298 4.25% 39.44% 0.80709
Six years -35.53% 32.88% -0.81736 59.32% 55.07% 2.23209**
Seven 
years
-85.51% 34.70% -2.38450** 86.51% 27.20% 2.78654***
Eight 
years
-76.99% 15.63% -1.11062 100.86% 14.35% 3.13945***
Nine 
years
-65.16% 29.22% -0.59231 120.64% 19.78% 3.44515***
Ten years -25.43% -0.29% -0.19004 116.23% -4.41% 3.29376***
NB: The returns are based on what happens from the first trading day to the end of each year. To 
further understand the performance of the IPOs over the years, their annual performance was also 
recorded. From years four to year ten, the yearly trends indicated positive performance for both the 
BHAR and the CAR.
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%
Table 3 shows the ten-year long-run performance based on a sample of 81 IPO 
companies for the period 1996–2002. From the table, it is clear that when using 
CAR, IPOs on the JSE outperformed the market by 116.23 per cent and the results 
are significant at the one per cent level. Also, when using the BHAR, IPOs on the 
JSE underperformed the market by -25.43 per cent, but the results are not statistically 
significant. This is in line with the study by M’kombe and Ward (2002), who 
established that IPOs on the JSE underperformed the market by 87.84 per cent over 
a ten-year period, when using the CAPM model. Also, Drobetz, Kammerman and 
Wälchli (2005) examined the long-run performance of 109 Swiss IPOs from 1983 
to 2000 and found that there was underperformance of -173.46 per cent (BHAR) 
after 120 months (ten years) when using the Swiss Performance Index (SPI) as 
benchmark. Also, when using the Vontobel Small-Cap Index (VSCI) benchmark, 
IPOs underperformed the market by -17.30 per cent using the BHAR. The findings 
of this study indicated a negative BHAR (-25.43%) using the JSE ALSI. However, 
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it is noted that the results were not statistically significant. Then again, when using 
CAR, Swiss IPOs underperformed the market by -9.51 per cent using the SPI 
benchmark and by -101.33 per cent with the VSCI benchmark. The findings for the 
CAR contradict those in this study, as the ten-year CAR was significantly positive 
(116.23%). The findings stress the effect different benchmarks and methodologies 
have, when calculating the long-run performance of IPOs. Various studies (Fama, 
1998; Alvarez & Gonzalez, 2001; M’kombe & Ward 2002; Sun, 2004) emphasised 
that the long-run underperformance of IPOs depended on the methodology used. 
Hence, investors should exercise great caution when using any of these methodologies 
to determine their long-run performance. 
63Since it has been established that IPOs underperform the market in the long 
run, when using BHAR and CAR, it is now important to determine whether the 
market period in which the IPOs were listed can be used as a predictor of long-
run performance, as highlighted in studies (Cook et al., 2003; Shikha & Balwinder, 
2008). A regression analysis is performed to determine if the market period can 
predict stock returns for BHAR and CAR over three, five and 10 years.
Table 4: Regression analysis for market period (hot and cold) and IPO long-
run performance
Dependent variable: IPO long-run performance
BHAR CAR
3 years 5 years 10 years 3 years 5 years 10 years
Intercept
B 1.875 1.267 1.727 1.750 2.400 2.500
T-value 6.049 3.678 6.034 5.723 8.279 11.722
Market 
period
Beta -0.152   
-2.513




0.071 1.169 0.045 0.666 -0.132   
-1.187T-value
R2 0.023 0.005 0.168 0.005 0.002 0.018
F-value 6.325 1.071 15.902 1.366 0.444 1.409
P-Value 0.012*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.243 0.506 0.239
Durbin-Watson stat 1.550 1.797 2.078 1.767 1.906 1.500
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%
Table 4 shows the regression analysis for the market period, with hot and cold market 
periods defined based on the annual volume of new listings. The market period was 
categorised as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO was listed in the hot market 
period, and as 0 if the IPO was listed in the cold market period. From Table 4, it 
is clear that the market period significantly affects the BHAR for three, five and 
ten years. However, the market period does not have any effect on the CAR for 
those time frames. The results for the BHAR are consistent with Helwege and Liang 
(2001) who, using the BHAR, established that the market period had a significant 
relationship with long-run stock returns for one, three and five years post-IPO. 
Thomadkis et al. (2012), using 254 Greek IPOs, established that the market period 
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significantly affected the three-year BHAR. However, when taking the three-year 
CAR from the first trading month to three years after going public, Thomadakis et 
al. (2012) established that the market period did not significantly affect the CAR. 
This confirms the findings of the present study, which established that the market 
period has no significant influence on long-run IPO returns, when computed using 
the CAR.
5 Conclusion
The empirical findings obtained in this study indicate that IPOs on the JSE 
underperformed the market over a three- and five-year period, when using BHAR 
and CAR, which is consistent with other international studies (M’kombe & Ward, 
2002; Gomper & Lerner, 2003; Kooli & Suret, 2004). However, IPOs on the JSE 
outperformed the market over a ten-year period when using CAR. The high level 
of long-run underperformance over a three-year period gives the impression that 
the long-run underperformance of IPOs on the JSE might be caused by investors’ 
over-optimism. Brav et al. (2000) provide evidence in support of the role of 
investors’ over-optimism in explaining long-run underperformance, which is 
consistent with the overreaction hypothesis (i.e., an assumption that in the long run, 
the market corrects the over-valuation caused in the initial period). As a result, the 
underperformance of IPOs in the long run can be explained by the fact that under 
the hypothesis of efficient markets, the price of IPOs should reach their equilibrium 
price, leading to a negative correlation between initial returns and the long-term 
performance of IPOs. 
64With regard to five-year long-run performance, the positive yearly returns 
identified in years four and five provide an incentive for investors to stay out of 
the stock market within the first three years after listing, to come in during the 
fourth year and possibly sell by the end of the fifth, so as to make profits. The 
positive returns in the fourth and fifth years indicate that IPO companies have had 
time to adjust to the market – the problem of asymmetric information is no longer 
relevant, and the market now reacts to the true behaviour of IPOs in the long run. 
Furthermore, also evident with respect to the ten-year long-run performance is the 
fact that positive returns are earned from the fourth year, which offers a positive 
incentive for investors to buy mainly portfolios comprising companies that have 
been trading for at least four years. 
65The results on the long-run performance of IPOs on the JSE demonstrated 
varied performances across the methodology used. These findings stress the effect 
the different benchmarks and methodologies have when calculating the long-run 
performance of IPOs. Various studies (Fama, 1998; M’kombe & Ward, 2002; 
Sun, 2004) emphasised that the long-run underperformance of IPOs depended on 
the methodology used. Based on these findings, it is recommended that investors 
considering a one-year holding period should buy the shares at the offer price and 
sell by the end of the first year. Moreover, with regard to long-term profits, investors 
are advised to stay out of the stock market within the first three years, but to come 
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in during the fourth year and buy mainly portfolios comprising companies that have 
been trading for at least four years. The advantage of this approach is that investors 
can gather enough information over the four-year period of trading to make an 
informed decision on the quality of the portfolio. However, the disadvantage is that 
investors may lose out on short-run returns which could be earned by purchasing 
IPO shares at the offer price and selling within the first year. Therefore, future 
studies should focus on the long-run performance using the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) and the Fama and French Three Factor model to determine which 
is best suited for calculating IPO returns on the JSE. Particular emphasis should be 
placed on ascertaining the accuracy of the predicting power of each model for long-
run IPO performance on the JSE. Different benchmarks should be employed when 
calculating the long-run performance of IPOs on the JSE, to ensure that the research 
results meet the needs of a wider range of international investors. Moreover, in 
exploring the differences in long-run performance in this study, only the market 
period was considered. However, there are many factors that affect the long-run 
returns of IPOs. As such, in addition to the market period, further studies on IPOs 
on the JSE should control for factors such as the size of the offer, the age of the firm, 
and the industry in which it operates.
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4APPENDICES




1 -0.16% -0.16% -0.16%
2 1.50% 0.28% 0.44%
3 1.93% -0.43% -0.71%
4 2.75% -1.39% -0.96%
5 7.98% -0.29% 1.10%
6 11.41% -0.23% 0.06%
7 10.79% -1.30% -1.07%
8 9.47% -2.39% -1.09%
9 7.04% -3.39% -1.00%
10 1.04% -3.62% -0.24%
11 -2.47% -5.65% -2.03%
12 -5.41% -8.77% -3.12%
13 -7.98% -13.91% -5.14%
14 -6.95% -14.78% -0.87%
15 -5.72% -16.95% -2.18%
16 -4.21% -18.31% -1.36%
17 -4.65% -22.90% -4.59%
18 -7.67% -25.20% -2.30%
19 -11.79% -28.77% -3.57%
20 -16.62% -32.20% -3.43%
21 -19.26% -35.28% -3.08%
22 -23.48% -38.48% -3.20%
23 -29.03% -42.20% -3.72%
24 -33.20% -45.29% -3.08%
25 -36.49% -46.06% -0.78%
26 -43.13% -47.35% -1.29%
27 -40.64% -45.17% 2.18%
28 -41.82% -47.91% -2.74%
18 37
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29 -47.56% -49.61% -1.70%
30 -48.34% -51.12% -1.52%
31 -52.48% -54.08% -2.96%
32 -55.90% -55.60% -1.52%
33 -58.23% -55.44% 0.16%
34 -61.06% -58.33% -2.89%
35 -62.78% -57.99% 0.34%
36 -65.59% -59.77% -1.78%




1 1.06% 1.06% 1.06%
2 4.41% 3.21% 2.15%
3 5.32% 2.93% -0.27%
4 6.53% 2.41% -0.53%
5 10.63% 3.49% 1.08%
6 11.53% 2.98% -0.51%
7 10.29% 2.12% -0.86%
8 10.99% 2.00% -0.12%
9 10.34% 0.45% -1.55%
10 -0.06% -0.63% -1.08%
11 -2.06% -2.07% -1.44%
12 -3.77% -4.59% -2.52%
13 -7.30% -9.39% -4.81%
14 -6.68% -11.22% -1.82%
15 -5.91% -12.91% -1.69%
16 -4.66% -14.25% -1.34%
17 -4.51% -17.82% -3.56%
18 -7.08% -18.80% -0.99%
19 -10.57% -21.39% -2.59%
20 -15.62% -24.89% -3.50%
21 -19.83% -28.61% -3.72%
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22 -24.46% -31.33% -2.72%
23 -29.31% -32.97% -1.65%
24 -32.19% -35.65% -2.67%
25 -37.28% -37.44% -1.79%
26 -39.74% -37.77% -0.34%
27 -38.16% -34.36% 3.41%
28 -40.23% -36.64% -2.28%
29 -41.78% -38.25% -1.60%
30 -42.45% -38.73% -0.49%
31 -45.72% -41.64% -2.91%
32 -49.42% -42.08% -0.44%
33 -51.78% -43.32% -1.24%
34 -52.55% -45.29% -1.97%
35 -54.22% -45.34% -0.05%
36 -56.33% -46.75% -1.42%
37 -59.86% -48.58% -1.83%
38 -60.13% -47.99% 0.59%
39 -61.67% -45.84% 2.15%
40 -65.10% -47.98% -2.14%
41 -66.45% -47.65% 0.33%
42 -69.69% -50.81% -3.16%
43 -67.34% -48.41% 2.40%
44 -66.45% -30.64% 17.76%
45 -64.42% -28.42% 2.22%
46 -62.00% -29.28% -0.85%
47 -62.81% -28.12% 1.16%
48 -64.02% -28.80% -0.68%
49 -65.74% -25.13% 3.66%
50 -65.72% -24.84% 0.29%
51 -65.30% -23.74% 1.10%
52 -63.92% -16.27% 7.47%
53 -64.40% -9.33% 6.94%
54 -62.69% -8.87% 0.46%
18 39
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55 -61.78% -9.36% -0.49%
56 -61.52% -6.22% 3.14%
57 -60.58% -5.76% 0.46%
58 -61.54% -6.14% -0.38%
59 -61.57% -6.70% -0.56%
60 -64.37% -7.77% -1.07%




1 -3.81% -3.81% -3.81%
2 -2.45% -1.96% 1.85%
3 0.56% -0.70% 1.26%
4 6.01% -1.16% -0.46%
5 18.23% 1.35% 2.51%
6 22.36% 2.14% 0.79%
7 20.72% 2.72% 0.58%
8 25.64% 5.52% 2.81%
9 28.69% 4.50% -1.03%
10 -5.39% -4.32% -8.81%
11 -6.24% -6.82% -2.50%
12 -5.33% -7.63% -0.81%
13 -9.34% -12.10% -4.48%
14 -6.83% -15.96% -3.86%
15 -0.42% -14.12% 1.84%
16 4.54% -14.46% -0.34%
17 4.73% -17.67% -3.22%
18 -2.66% -18.07% -0.39%
19 -8.28% -16.76% 1.31%
20 -12.89% -22.51% -5.75%
21 -20.02% -26.97% -4.46%
22 -24.16% -28.56% -1.59%
23 -27.80% -30.17% -1.62%
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24 -31.43% -34.25% -4.07%
25 -41.80% -37.98% -3.74%
26 -40.71% -39.87% -1.88%
27 -36.98% -40.86% -0.99%
28 -42.42% -41.64% -0.79%
29 -43.39% -44.88% -3.24%
30 -46.43% -47.13% -2.25%
31 -43.64% -47.22% -0.09%
32 -47.35% -46.55% 0.67%
33 -50.27% -49.77% -3.22%
34 -48.26% -44.70% 5.07%
35 -49.96% -48.20% -3.49%
36 -50.66% -49.36% -1.16%
37 -55.52% -52.35% -3.00%
38 -55.30% -52.92% -0.57%
39 -57.32% -48.77% 4.15%
40 -59.73% -49.62% -0.85%
41 -60.35% -49.83% -0.22%
42 -64.83% -53.91% -4.08%
43 -58.16% -48.26% 5.65%
44 -55.65% -46.05% 2.21%
45 -50.49% -41.55% 4.50%
46 -45.25% -41.95% -0.40%
47 -46.49% -37.68% 4.27%
48 -44.02% -35.20% 2.48%
49 -46.00% -28.39% 6.81%
50 -41.96% -27.82% 0.56%
51 -40.28% -23.64% 4.19%
52 -33.17% -17.03% 6.61%
53 -32.63% -6.31% 10.71%
54 -29.25% -4.08% 2.24%
55 -27.21% -5.73% -1.65%
56 -28.20% -1.04% 4.69%
18 41
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57 -24.39% -1.40% -0.36%
58 -23.34% 1.08% 2.47%
59 -21.10% 3.14% 2.07%
60 -26.41% 4.25% 1.10%
61 -30.81% 6.45% 2.20%
62 -29.59% 14.92% 8.48%
63 -27.62% 25.12% 10.19%
64 -28.92% 41.20% 16.09%
65 -30.56% 42.29% 1.09%
66 -27.39% 44.24% 1.95%
67 -27.11% 47.03% 2.79%
68 -21.10% 52.52% 5.49%
69 -24.77% 53.75% 1.24%
70 -35.32% 53.54% -0.21%
71 -35.25% 56.43% 2.89%
72 -35.53% 59.32% 2.89%
73 -38.39% 60.83% 1.52%
74 -48.52% 65.81% 4.98%
75 -56.70% 64.45% -1.36%
76 -56.17% 70.43% 5.99%
77 -57.39% 72.67% 2.24%
78 -54.71% 76.26% 3.58%
79 -52.03% 78.06% 1.80%
80 -59.05% 79.33% 1.27%
81 -69.45% 84.51% 5.18%
82 -78.95% 81.28% -3.24%
83 -83.28% 83.50% 2.22%
84 -85.51% 86.51% 3.02%
85 -82.27% 86.78% 0.27%
86 -80.99% 86.85% 0.07%
87 -86.25% 85.94% -0.91%
88 -88.71% 88.09% 2.16%
89 -86.73% 87.98% -0.12%
1742 
Brownhilder Ngek Neneh and Van Aardt Smit
90 -85.12% 88.35% 0.37%
91 -77.41% 94.93% 6.58%
92 -77.19% 97.51% 2.57%
93 -75.59% 100.13% 2.62%
94 -74.02% 100.68% 0.56%
95 -82.36% 97.18% -3.51%
96 -76.99% 100.86% 3.68%
97 -76.06% 102.03% 1.17%
98 -81.92% 103.17% 1.13%
99 -81.07% 107.21% 4.04%
100 -68.95% 113.23% 6.02%
101 -67.58% 113.69% 0.46%
102 -66.50% 115.30% 1.61%
103 -59.80% 114.26% -1.05%
104 -64.42% 113.15% -1.11%
105 -60.57% 112.97% -0.18%
106 -50.62% 115.37% 2.40%
107 -53.84% 114.23% -1.14%
108 -63.59% 120.64% 6.41%
109 -53.85% 121.04% 0.39%
110 -45.11% 122.60% 1.57%
111 -45.50% 119.67% -2.93%
112 -59.52% 120.06% 0.38%
113 -70.15% 121.75% 1.69%
114 -61.57% 122.10% 0.35%
115 -46.82% 120.45% -1.65%
116 -51.46% 120.18% -0.27%
117 -47.08% 121.17% 0.99%
118 -43.80% 120.61% -0.56%
119 -37.09% 118.35% -2.26%
120 -25.43% 116.23% -2.12%
